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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
MAZHAR TABESH, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20040358-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a conviction on one count of aggravated arson, a first 
degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to the "pour-over" provisions of Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)0) (Supp. 2002). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
I. Has defendant demonstrated insufficient evidence to support the 
verdict where he has not fully marshaled the evidence? 
To prevail on a sufficiency challenge to a jury verdict, a defendant "must marshal 
the evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is 
insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." State v. Pritchett, 
2003 UT 24, \ 22, 69 P.3d 1278 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). A 
verdict will only be reversed "when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive 
or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed the crime of which he [or she] was convicted." State v. 
Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) 
(alteration in original). 
II. Should this Court reach defendant's prosecutorial misconduct claim 
where defendant's only comment at the time was, "I will reserve an 
objection on that," defendant never pursued the matter further on the 
record, and, by his own admission, he received all the relief he 
requested at trial? 
No standard of review applies to this issue. 
III. Did the trial court commit reversible error in admitting scientific 
evidence where the same inference would have existed even had the 
challenged evidence not been admitted? 
"Although the admission or exclusion of evidence is a question of law, [this Court] 
review[s] a trial court's decision to admit or exclude specific evidence for an abuse of 
discretion." State v. Cruz-Meza, 2003 UT 32, ^  8, 76 P.3d 1165. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statutory provision is attached at Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-103 (1999) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On September 19, 2002, defendant was charged with aggravated arson, a first 
degree felony (R. 4-5, 7-8). After a preliminary hearing, defendant moved to dismiss for 
lack of evidence (R. 55-68). The magistrate denied defendant's motion and bound him 
over as charged (R. 69-75). 
2 
Defendant's four-day trial began on February 9,2004 (R. 393). At the close of the 
State's evidence, defendant moved to dismiss for lack of a prima facie case (R. 396:63). 
The trial court denied defendant's motion (R. 396:63). After defendant presented his 
defense, the jury convicted him as charged (R. 396:248). Defendant was sentenced to a 
suspended term of five-years-to-life, was ordered to serve 365 days in jail, and was placed 
on 36 months' probation (R. 261-63). 
Defendant moved for a new trial, claiming prosecutorial misconduct in closing 
argument (R. 266-78). The State opposed the motion (R. 289-93). After a hearing, the 
trial court denied the motion (R. 368-70). 
Defendant timely appealed (R. 371-73). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
On July 21, 2002, a fire was intentionally started in room 112 of defendant's motel 
in Heber City, Utah (R. 394:74, 164-66, 172, 186-87). At the time, the room was locked 
(R. 394:112, 128). Defendant's fingerprints were the only ones found on the inside door 
knob, on an illegible motel receipt found on the night stand, and on a taco shell bag also 
found on the night stand (R. 395:131-32, 182, 185; R. 396:50, 54-56). Although there 
was a fire detector in the room, its battery had been disconnected (R. 395:56-57). 
Defendant's wife's first reaction when she saw the fire was to point to room 112 as she 
screamed, "My husband" (R. 394:16, 18, 36). 
!Except as otherwise indicated, the facts are presented in the light most favorable 
to the jury's verdict. See State v. Green, 2004 UT 76,11 n.l, 99 P.3d 820. 
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Next to room 112, a stairwell led to rooms upstairs, where a fire had also been 
intentionally started in the hallway (R. 394:166-71, 186). All the rooms upstairs were 
locked (R. 395:96, 211). In one of the upstairs rooms, the fire detector lay on the floor 
(R. 394:153). In several other rooms, the batteries had been disconnected, even though 
defendant claimed the alarms were checked regularly (R. 395:90-91, 97-98, 174). 
Shortly after the fires began, a passer-by, who was also an experienced fireman, 
noticed the fire and stopped to help (R. 394:9). His first act was to locate defendant and 
tell him to call 911 (R. 394:12). Instead, defendant, who was "[rjather calm," followed 
the fireman to the scene of the fire (R. 394:11, 14). The fireman had to ask defendant 
twice before defendant actually returned to his office to make the call (R. 394:12, 14, 32). 
When defendant returned to room 112, he stood by passively as emergency 
personnel tried to enter the locked room to confirm that no one was inside (R. 394:22, 25, 
112; R. 396:141). Only after an officer threatened to break down the door did defendant 
object, telling the officer he would get a key (R. 394:112, 128). 
Defendant had purchased the Alpine Lodge in 1997 with his father-in-law (R. 
396:111-12). The idea was to provide income for defendant's father-in-law and mother-
in-law, as well as their sons and their sons' families once they immigrated from Pakistan 
(R. 393:163; R. 396:110). In 2002, defendant's brothers-in-law still had not immigrated 
(R. 393:164; R. 396:110). Defendant was required to do most of the work around the 
motel, sometimes even taking a leave from his full-time job in Salt Lake City (R. 
393:164; R. 396:119). 
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For at least eighteen months before the fires, the motel's profit was marginal (R. 
395:238-43). During several months over that period, the income from room rentals was 
insufficient to cover the monthly mortgage payment (R. 395:238-43). Sometimes, 
defendant had to lend money to the motel in order to pay its mortgage (R. 396:115-16). 
Defendant put the motel on the market in 2000 (R. 393:163). After over just a 
year, defendant had one potential buyer; the potential buyer, however, never made an 
offer (R. 393:168-69, 175). On February 2, 2002, defendant placed the motel on the 
market again (R. 380:4). The only offer defendant received was on August 19, 2002, 
after the fires (R. 380:7, 10). 
In early July, 2002, just weeks before the fire, defendant complained about the 
increased insurance rates on his motel (R. 380:20). The next week, however, defendant 
increased the insurance on the motel (R. 380:23-24,26, 30). At the same time, he also 
secured renters' insurance on his personal belongings in the amount of $31,600 (R. 
380:24-26). 
On the night of the fire, defendant claimed that he had rented room 112 to a guest 
(R. 394:12, 111). The receipt he provided police, however, was illegible, even though 
defendant claimed that the guest's handwriting seemed normal (R. 395:64, 67, 76-78; R. 
396:163). After the fire, police seized and reviewed defendant's motel receipts from 
January 2001 through September 2002 (R. 395:68, 235). Of the 831 receipts reviewed, 
only three were partially illegible (R.395:68, 72). In two of the cases, defendant had 
secured identification from the guests and reprinted that information on the receipts (R. 
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395:71, 74). On the third—the receipt retrieved from room 112 on the night of the 
fire—no such information was reprinted (St. Exh. 33). 
In his first interview with police, defendant stated that Deputy Graves was the 
person who retrieved the receipt from room 112, picking it up with both hands (R. 
395:84-85). In the second interview and at trial, defendant testified that the reason his 
fingerprints were on the receipt and taco bag in room 112 was because Deputy Graves 
had asked defendant to retrieve the receipt for him, and defendant had to move the taco 
bag off the receipt in order to retrieve it (R. 395:87; R. 396:133-34, 143-44, 177). 
Deputy Graves' testimony contradicted both of defendant's stories. Deputy 
Graves testified that he never asked defendant to retrieve the receipt (R. 394:134). 
Rather, when they arrived at the room, defendant told Deputy Graves where the receipt 
was in the room, even though it was not in plain view (R. 394:118-19). At that point, 
Deputy Graves instructed a gloved firefighter to retrieve the receipt (R.394:120). The 
firefighter corroborated the deputy's testimony (R. 394:143-45). 
Finally, the fire marshal testified that he found evidence of accelerant pours both in 
room 112 and in the hallway to the rooms above room 112 (R. 394:164-66, 172, 186-87). 
Officers testified that they seized two containers of paint thinner—an accelerant—from 
defendant's property (R. 395:232) One of those containers was paint thinner labeled 
Clean Strip; the other was labeled E-Z Paint Thinner (R. 395:232). 
Jennifer McNair, a crime lab expert, then testified. McNair testified that the main 
accelerant used in the fires was gasoline (R. 396:11-13). However, a different accelerant, 
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a "medium petroleum distillate," was found on carpet in the closet of room 112 (R. 
396:13-14). McNair testified that paint thinners are medium petroleum distillates (R. 
396:13). 
McNair testified that she compared the paint thinner in the container labeled Clean 
Strip to the accelerant used in the closet, and that the Clean Strip thinner was not 
consistent with the accelerant used in the closet (R. 396:14-15). McNair then testified 
that the amount of paint thinner in the other container, labeled E-Z Paint Thinner, was 
insufficient to compare to the accelerant used in the closet (R. 396:16). As a result, the 
crime lab purchased a different container of E-Z Paint Thinner from a local store and used 
that to make the comparison with the accelerant used in the closet (R. R. 396:16). Over 
defendant's objections, McNair testified that "[d]ue to the lack of environmental control 
of the questioned sample [from the closet], no conclusion as to common origin could be 
made" between the accelerant used in the closet and the newly purchased E-Z Paint 
Thinner (R. 396:21). Thus, the two accelerants "could not be matched" (R. 396:23). 
However, they also "could not be excluded from each other" (R. 396:23). 
On cross-examination, defendant asked: "Well, I guess, scientifically when you say 
you can't exclude it, that doesn't really give us a lot to go on, does it? Just simply means 
that there's no conclusion that can be drawn from it, effectively?" (R. 396:23). McNair 
responded, "That's correct" (R. 396:23). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Issue I. Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to support his 
conviction. Defendant, however, fails to marshal most of the evidence supporting the 
jury's verdict. Thus, he necessarily fails to establish that the evidence was insufficient. 
Issue II. Defendant claims that the prosecutor committed prosecutorial 
misconduct in closing argument by improperly shifting the burden to defendant to 
produce evidence in his defense. This Court should reject defendant's claim because he 
made a conscious decision to waive it below. 
Even if defendant did raise a timely objection at trial, he admitted at the hearing on 
his new trial motion that the only relief he sought at the time was a curative instruction, 
which was given. Because defendant received all the relief he sought, he cannot now 
claim that relief was inadequate. 
In any case, the prosecutor's brief remarks properly commented on defendant's 
testimony and the paucity of evidence supporting that testimony. Moreover, the 
comments were harmless given that defense counsel responded to them during his closing 
argument and the trial court gave a curative instruction re-affirming the State's burden of 
proof at the close of argument. 
Issue III. Defendant claims that the trial court erred in admitting a crime lab 
expert's testimony that the comparison of E-Z Paint Thinner purchased from a local store 
and accelerant used in the closet to room 112 was inconclusive. Defendant claims that 
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the expert's testimony was inadmissible under rules 403, 701, and 702 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence, 
The same expert, however, had already testified that there was not enough E-Z 
Paint Thinner remaining in the container seized from defendant's motel to conduct a 
comparison. Thus, even before the expert's challenged testimony, the clear inference 
before the jury was that the E-Z Paint Thinner seized could not be excluded as the 
accelerant used in the closet. The expert's additional testimony, therefore, put nothing 
before the jury that it did not already have. Under such circumstances, defendant cannot 
show that he was prejudiced by the trial court's ruling, even if it were erroneous. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED INSUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE VERDICT WHERE HE HAS NOT 
FULLY MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE 
Defendant claims that the evidence in this case "does not support a finding, beyond 
a reasonable doubt, that Appellant committed the crime in question." Aplt. Br. at 26. 
Specifically, defendant claims that, "while much evidence was adduced suggesting that 
the fire was the result of arson, there was relatively little evidence indicating that 
Appellant committed the crime." Aplt. Br. at 25. Defendant's claim lacks merit. 
A defendant's "burden on appeal against [a] jury verdict is to 'first marshal all 
record evidence that supports the challenged finding.'" State v. Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, 
125, 69 P.3d 1278 (quoting Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (emphasis added)). He must then 
"demonstrate how the evidence against him was 'so insufficient that reasonable minds 
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could not have reached the verdict.9" Id. at f 26 (quoting State v. Colwell, 2000 UT 8, f 
42,994P.2dl77). 
In this case, defendant was charged with aggravated arson (R. 7-8). The State 
therefore had to prove that, "by means of fire or explosives," defendant "intentionally and 
unlawfully damage[d]... a habitable structure." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-103 (1999). 
At trial, defendant stipulated that his motel was "a habitable structure" (R. 
396:190), In his motion for new trial, defendant conceded that the evidence was 
sufficient to show that someone had "intentionally and unlawfully damage[d] [that] 
structure" "by means of fire" (R. 273). Thus, on appeal, defendant challenges only 
whether the evidence was sufficient to show that he was that person. See Aplt. Br. at 21, 
25. 
Defendant does not claim, however, that no evidence supports a finding that he 
started the fires. Rather, he admits that "there was relatively little evidence indicating that 
Appellant committed the crime," but claims that such evidence "does not support a 
finding, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Appellant committed the crime in question." 
Aplt. Br. at 25-26. 
In making his argument, defendant misconstrues this Court's duty on appeal. "To 
determine whether there was sufficient evidence to convict a defendant," this Court 
"do[es] not examine whether [it] believe[s] that the evidence at trial established guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, H 18, 10 P.3d 346. "[As] 
long as there is some evidence and reasonable inferences to support the jury's verdict, 
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[this Court] will not disturb a jury's findings." State v. Tucker, 2004 UT App 217, \ 20, 
96 P.3d 368 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). As stated, 
defendant concedes that there was "some" evidence that supports the jury's verdict. 
In any event, defendant's argument is based on an incomplete marshaling of the 
evidence. For example, although defendant acknowledges that "[t]he fire alarm in room 
112 was not working, nor were the fire alarms in 109, 110, or 111," Aplt. Br. at 23, he 
fails to acknowledge that each of those rooms were locked at the time of the fires and 
that, in each case, the battery had been disconnected even though defendant claimed that 
the fire alarms were checked regularly (R. 395:56-57, 90-91, 97-98, 174). 
Similarly, although defendant acknowledges that his "fingerprints were found on 
the door to room 112; the receipt for the individual who stayed in room 112; and on the 
taco bag found on the nightstand in room 112," Aplt. Br. at 24, he fails to acknowledge 
that his were the only prints found on those items (R. 395:131-32, 182, 185; R. 396:50, 
54-56). He also fails to acknowledge that his innocent explanation for his fingerprints— 
that an officer told him to retrieve the receipt and that he had to move the taco bag in 
order to do so—was rebutted not only by the officer but by a firefighter who was also 
present (R. 394:118-20, 134, 143-45; R. 396:133-34, 143-44, 177). 
Third, although defendant acknowledges that he "increased the insurance coverage 
on the North building of The Lodge weeks before it was set on fire," Aplt. Br. at 24, he 
fails to marshal evidence that he increased the insurance only a week after he complained 
that his insurance premiums were getting too high, and that, in addition to increasing 
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coverage on the motel itself, he for the first time secured insurance on his personal 
property maintained at the motel (R. 380:20, 23-26, 30). 
Fourth, although defendant acknowledges that his motel "was only marginally 
profitable," Aplt. Br. at 24, he fails to marshal evidence that during numerous months 
before the fire, the income from the motel was insufficient to pay the mortgage (R. 
393:164; R. 396:115-16, 119). He also fails to cite evidence that, although the motel was 
originally purchased for his in-laws, he was forced to do most of the work to run it, even 
though he had a full-time job in Salt Lake City (R. 393:164; R. 396:115-16, 119). 
Finally, defendant contends that "[t]he individual who checked into room 112 did 
not have any ID and the receipt was too illegible to determine a name or address." Aplt. 
Br. at 24. Defendant, however, fails to acknowledge that the only evidence of an 
individual checking into room 112 on the night of the fire was defendant's own 
testimony, which the jury could very well have rejected in light of substantial 
evidence—none of which defendant marshals—undermining his testimony. For example, 
defendant does not marshal evidence that of the 831 receipts he had received over the 
eighteen months before the fire, this particular receipt was the only illegible one on which 
defendant had not written some identifying information (R. 395:71, 74). Nor does he cite 
his own testimony that when the alleged renter filled out the receipt to room 112, 
defendant found nothing wrong with the guest's handwriting (R. 396:163). Nor does he 
cite evidence that, when he finally gave investigators access to room 112, he also told 
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them where the receipt was located on the night stand, even though the receipt was folded 
and not in plain view (R. 394:118-19). 
All of this additional evidence supports the jury's verdict that defendant started the 
fires in this case. So too does other evidence not marshaled by defendant. For example, 
defendant does not marshal evidence that he just watched as emergency personnel banged 
on the door to room 112 trying to determine whether anyone was inside, intervening only 
when one of those personnel threatened to bust the door down, at which time defendant 
objected and said he would get a key (R. 394:22, 25, 112, 128; R. 396:141). Nor does 
defendant marshal evidence that he gave inconsistent stories to the police concerning 
whether his wife knew that a person had rented room 112, initially telling them that she 
did not know, and then telling them that she did (R. 395:99-102). 
Because defendant has not marshaled all the evidence supporting the jury's 
verdict, he has necessarily failed to show that the evidence, as properly marshaled, was 
insufficient to support the jury's verdict. See Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, fflf 25-26. 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD REJECT DEFEND ANT5 S 
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT CLAIM WHERE HIS ONLY 
COMMENT AT THE TIME WAS, "I WILL RESERVE AN 
OBJECTION ON THAT," DEFENDANT NEVER PURSUED THE 
MATTER FURTHER ON THE RECORD, AND BY HIS OWN 
ADMISSION, HE RECEIVED ALL THE RELIEF HE REQUESTED 
AT TRIAL 
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial 
because the prosecutor "inappropriately and impermissibly shifted the burden of proof to 
the defense" during closing argument. Aplt. Br. at 30-31. This Court should reject 
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defendant's claim because he affirmatively waived it below. In any case, the prosecutor's 
brief remarks were a proper comment on defendant's testimony. 
A. Proceedings below. 
At trial, Sergeant Perry Rose testified for the State that he seized room receipts 
from defendant's motel for the period from January 2001 to September 2002 (R. 395: 
235). Based on those receipts, Rose calculated the monthly rental income of the motel 
(R. 395:238-43). Oftentimes, that monthly income was less than the monthly mortgage 
payment defendant owed (R. 395:238-43). 
When defendant testified later, defense counsel asked him whether Sergeant 
Rose's calculations were "an accurate assessment of all of the receipts for those two 
years" (R. 396:116). Defendant responded in the negative, claiming that when the police 
seized the receipts, they did so only from defendant's office and living quarters (R. 
396:116-17). Defendant claimed that because his father-in-law did most of the 
bookkeeping, the father-in-law had some of the receipts in his apartment (R. 396:117). 
In closing argument, the prosecutor commented on defendant's testimony. Those 
comments included the following: 
Mr. Tabesh knew that nobody was staying upstairs. The next who 
question, who accepted this receipt... and thought that that looked 
okay? That is just crazy. That is not okay. There is not a single 
letter or number that is legible on that. Even on the other examples 
that we had that officer's [sic] went through, every single receipt the 
prior year-and-a-half, all the receipts they had in the office—and, by 
the way, Mr. Tabesh said they didn 't get all the receipts. This is 
what we have here. I haven't seen any others brought it. 
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(R. 396:200-01) (emphasis added). 
At that point, defense counsel interrupted, stating, "Your Honor, I will reserve an 
objection on that" (R. 396:201). The Court responded, "You may" (R. 396:201). The 
State then continued its argument, noting that on the only two other illegible receipts 
police had recovered, defendant had written identifying information (R. 396:201). The 
State did not revisit defendant's testimony concerning unrecovered receipts during the 
rest of its initial argument or in its rebuttal (R. 396:201-15, 239-44). 
In his closing argument, however, defendant responded to the prosecutor's brief 
remarks: 
. . . [T]he evidence that you have in this case, and the only evidence 
before you, is that Mr. Tabesh made significant—or was able to 
make enough money to pay his mortgage and keep the business in 
operation. 
Now, you have that evidence, and it's in front of you, 
but you have that evidence from a number of sources. The 
very first source you have it from is from Officer Rose, who 
didn't even get all of the receipts. Now, Counsel says, 
"Where are they?" That, again, is a problem. It's not my job. 
It is his job. It's their burden of proof, hence, the objection 
that was made in that regard. He asked Officer Rose with a 
search warrant to go get some receipts and even with only 
partial receipts he shows that Mr. Tabesh has made the 
monthly payments on the mortgage. That wasn't all. 
I asked Officer Rose, I said, "Did you ask Mr. Tabesh for any 
additional receipts?" 
He said, "No." 
(R. 396:224-25). 
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At the end of defense counsel's argument, a bench conference was held (R. 
396:239). Defense counsel, however, placed nothing concerning his reserved objection 
on the record (R. 396:239). 
At the end of the State's rebuttal argument, another bench conference was held (R. 
396:244). Again, defendant failed to place any objection to the prosecutor's prior 
remarks on the record (R. 396:244). 
After the second bench conference, the trial court gave the jury an instruction 
reminding them that the State alone carried the burden of proof: "The Court has instructed 
you on numerous other occasions, the Court will make one final instruction, that at no 
time does the burden ever shift to the defendant to produce any evidence with respect to a 
criminal case" (R. 396:244). 
Following his conviction, defendant moved for a new trial, claiming that the 
prosecutor's remarks concerning the lack of receipts improperly shifted the burden of 
proof to defendant (R. 266-78). The State opposed defendant's motion, arguing that 
defendant waived any objection at trial in favor of a curative instruction (R. 292). In any 
case, the State argued, the prosecutor's statements were proper comment on the paucity of 
evidence produced by defendant to support his testimony (R. 291). 
A hearing on defendant's motion was held on June 4, 2004 (R. 383). At that 
hearing, defense counsel acknowledged that he "did not make a motion for a mistrial" 
based on the prosecutor's comments, but, rather, "objected and asked for a curative 
16 
instruction" (R. 383:7).2 The State reiterated its claim that defendant waived any 
objection to the prosecutor's closing argument. 
Concerning whether defendant had waived his objection at trial, the court recalled 
that defendant had reserved an objection and that "we had some conferences, sidebar (R. 
383:9). However, "[w]hat was said then I don't have a definite recollection other than 
Mr. Yengich indicated that he requested a curative instruction and the Court gave that 
curative instruction" (R. 383:9-10). The court therefore reserved any ruling on whether 
defendant had waived his claim, concluding that, in any case, "the Court does believe that 
even if [the argument] was improper argument that it was not the type of—or was not in 
the area where it would have had an impact that would have been—would have brought a 
different result" (R. 383:10). 
Defense counsel, recognizing that the waiver issue could affect defendant's appeal, 
urged the trial court "to deal with the waiver issue," asserting that "[tjhere was a 
conference at the bench reserving any motion as far as a mistrial is concerned but what 
was clearly stated was that the objection related to comment on the failure of the 
defendant to present evidence that that's exactly why you instructed the jury in the way I 
requested you to and so I think . . . it cannot be claimed that a specific objection was not 
made" (R. 383:11). The State countered: 
2In his affidavit attached to defendant's new trial motion, defense counsel stated he 
"personally objected in a timely manner on the basis that the [prosecutor's] argument 
constituted prosecutorial misconduct and that a new trial was, therefore, warranted" (R. 
268). Counsel's admission at the new trial hearing, of course, negates that statement. 
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That's completely wrong, Your Honor. If defendant had 
made an objection that I had committed misconduct, I would have 
responded to that. Instead, when we had that sidebar, Mr. Yengich 
said, you know, instead of going through that objection thing, I'll 
just request a curative instruction and I had no problem with the 
Court repeating an instruction it had already given. I have no 
problem with that even now but for a finding that I committed 
misconduct I would have objected and, so yes, I was never given the 
opportunity and the Court never ruled on that issue and that's the 
relevant issue. There's nothing to appeal from because there's no 
ruling on the record on that issue because no objection was made. 
(R. 383:11-12). When defense counsel responded that the court's giving a curative 
instruction "is a ruling effectively," the State countered, "Not when there's a stipulation 
to it" (R. 383:12). The trial court concluded: 
Well, there was clearly no chance for [the prosecutor] to 
respond on the record to the objection. Clearly the Court did, 
based upon stipulation of the parties [give] a curative 
instruction. Without a transcript I'm not going to make a 
ruling with respect to whether there was a waiver. 
(R. 383:12). "I just haven't made a decision one way or the other" (R. 383:13). When 
defense counsel noted, "but that holds us up in appeal times and issues," the court stated, 
"[i]f the Court of Appeals remands it then we'll make a decision" (R. 383:13). 
B. This Court should reject defendant's claim because he waived it 
below. 
The general rule in criminal cases is that "'a contemporaneous objection or some 
form of specific preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial court 
record before an appellate court will review such claim on appeal.'" State v. Johnson, 
11A P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 1989) (citation omitted); see also State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 
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74, Tj 11, 10 P.3d 346. The objection at trial must "be specific enough to give the trial 
court notice of the very error . . . complained of," Beehive Medical Elecs., Inc. v. Square 
D. Co., 669 P.2d 859, 860 (Utah 1983), so that the court "might have an opportunity to 
correct [it] if [the court] deems it proper," Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. 
Barrutia, 526 P.2d 47, 51 (Utah 1974). This preservation rule "applies to every claim . . . 
unless a defendant can demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error' 
occurred." Holgate, 2000 UT 74, \ 11 (citations omitted). 
Moreover, "it [is] the responsibility of the parties, not the trial court, to ensure that 
any objections were preserved in the record." State v. Calliham, 2002 UT 86, f 33 n.l 1, 
55 P.3d 573; see also State v. Worthen, 765 P.2d 839, 845 (Utah 1988) (rejecting claim in 
part because the record did not establish it had been preserved). "If... the ruling was 
made in an off-the-record bench conference, the defendant [has the duty to] request[] that 
a record be made of the ruling or, in the alternative, prepare[] a statement of the 
proceedings according to Rule 11(g), [Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure]." Worthen, 
765 P.2d at 845. Otherwise, this Court "ha[s] no record [of the] objection being made 
below and must conclude, therefore, that the trial court's attention was never called to it." 
State v. Tucker, 709 P.2d 313,315 (Utah 1985), abrogated on other grounds by State v. 
Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986). 
Finally, "'if a party through counsel has made a conscious decision to refrain from 
objecting or has led the trial court into error, [this Court] will then decline to save that 
party from the error.'" Calliham, 2002 UT 86, \ 70 (quoting State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 
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155, 158 (Utah 1989)). "'Defendants are thus not entitled to both the benefit of not 
objecting at trial and the benefit of objecting on appeal.9" Id. (quoting Bullock, 791 P.2d 
at 159). Nor will this Court consider an issue raised for the first time in a post-trial 
motion if the trial court concludes that the claim was waived at trial. See State v. 
Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1161 (Utah 1991). 
In this case, defendant's immediate response to the prosecutor's comment was not 
to raise an objection but only to reserve one (R. 396:201). Although two off-the-record 
bench conferences followed before the conclusion of closing arguments, defendant never 
addressed his reserved objection on the record (R. 396:239, 244). Thus, the record 
contains no indication of whether defendant even raised an objection during the bench 
conferences, let alone the basis of such an objection. Because defendant made "no record 
[of the] objection being made below," this Court "must conclude . . . that the trial court's 
attention was never called to it," and that it was therefore waived. Tucker, 709 P.2d at 
315; see also Calliharn, 2002 UT 86, ^  33 n.l 1; Worthen, 765 P.2d at 845. 
Moreover, although a defendant may successfully revive a claim in a post-trial 
motion if the trial court reaches its merits, see Johnson, 821 P.2d at 1161, this Court 
should conclude, under the unique facts of this case, that the trial court did not revive 
defendant's claim here. 
In this case, the trial court admittedly did not find that defendant's claim had been 
waived. At the same time, however, the court also did not find that defendant's claim had 
not been waived. To the contrary, the court specifically refused defendant's request to 
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make such a finding without first reviewing the trial transcripts (R. 383:12). Defendant 
never asked the trial court to revisit the issue once the trial transcripts were completed. 
Thus, defendant never took the action necessary for the trial court to rule that his claim 
had in fact not been waived. Defendant's failure to do so should preclude review of his 
claim on appeal See, e.g., Calliham, 2002 UT 86, ^ f 33 n.l 1 (holding that "it [is] the 
responsibility of the parties, not the trial court, to ensure that any objections were 
preserved in the record"). 
More importantly, defense counsel's concessions at the hearing on his new trial 
motion make clear that he did in fact affirmatively waive any prosecutorial misconduct 
claim at trial. At the new trial hearing, counsel acknowledged that he "did not make a 
motion for a mistrial" based on the prosecutor's remarks, but, rather, only "asked for a 
curative instruction" (R. 383:7). Counsel also explained why he did not move for a 
mistrial: "I think practically and I think candidly, Your Honor, that this is not a case that 
at that po in t . . . , that this Court was lightly to say, no, I'm going to grant a mistrial and 
I'm not going to submit it to the jury (R. 383:7). 
The clear import of defense counsel's concessions is that, even assuming he did 
object to the prosecutor's closing remarks during one of the bench conferences, counsel 
made a conscious decision at that time to forego asking for a mistrial in favor of a 
curative instruction, which was given. Because defendant received the only relief he 
sought at trial, he cannot now complain that such relief was inadequate. See Calliham, 
2002 UT 86, Tf 70 ("Defendants are . . . not entitled to both the benefit of not objecting at 
21 
trial and the benefit of objecting on appeal.") (quoting Bullock, 791 P.2d at 159); see also 
State v. Smith, 776 P.2d 929, 932 (Utah App. 1989) (holding that where "defendant had 
two opportunities to move for a mistrial" and "[h]e deliberately and affirmatively refused 
on both occasions,. .. defendant waived his right to now complain"); cf. State v. 
Winward, 941 P.2d 627, 633, 635 (Utah App. 1997) (rejecting plain error challenge to 
prosecutor's closing remarks where defendant strategically chose not to "request a 
curative instruction or move for a mistrial"). Stated otherwise, defendant cannot claim 
after trial that the prosecutor's remarks warranted a new trial when he consciously chose 
not to request that relief at trial. 
C. Even on the merits, defendant's claim fails because the 
prosecutor's remarks were proper comment on the evidence in 
light of defendant's testimony. 
Even if this Court were to reach the merits of this claim, it fails because the 
prosecutor's remarks were proper comment on defendant's testimony and the paucity of 
evidence defendant produced to support that testimony. 
To establish prosecutorial misconduct, defendant must show that "'the 
prosecutor's comments call[ed] the jurors' attention to matters not proper for their 
consideration and [that] the comments have a reasonable likelihood of prejudicing the 
jury by significantly influencing its verdict.'" State v. Jimenez, 2001 UT App 68, ^ f 15, 21 
P.3d 1142 (quoting State v. Reed, 2000 UT 68,118, 8 P.3d 1025) (additional citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted), cert, denied, 29 P.3d 1 (Utah 2001). "Tn determining 
whether a given statement constitutes prosecutorial misconduct, the statement must be 
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viewed in light of the totality of the evidence presented at trial.'" State v. Wright, 893 
P.2d 1113,1118 (Utah App. 1995) (quoting State v. Cummins, 839 P.2d 848, 852 (Utah 
App. 1992)). 
"'Because a trial court is in the best position to determine an alleged error's impact 
on the proceedings, [this Court] will not reverse a trial court's denial of a mistrial [or new 
trial] motion based on prosecutorial misconduct absent an abuse of discretion.'" State v. 
Pritchett, 2003 UT 24, \ 10, 69 P.3d 1278 (quoting State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 276 
(Utah 1998). "This standard is met only if the error is substantial and prejudicial such 
that there is a reasonable likelihood that in its absence, there would have been a more 
favorable result for the defendant.'" Id. (quoting Harmon, 956 P.2d at 276) (additional 
citations and quotation marks omitted). 
Finally, trial counsel have "'considerable latitude in closing argument to the jury 
and may fully recount the evidence adduced and the reasonable inferences to be drawn 
therefrom.'" State v. Baker, 963 P.2d 801, 804 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. 
Hopkins, 782 P.2d 475, 478 (Utah 1989)). Moreover, "'the prosecutor has the duty to 
argue the case based on the total picture of the evidence or lack of evidence, including the 
paucity or absence of evidence adduced by the defense.'" State v. Tilt, 2004 UT App 395, 
\ 18, 101 P.3d 838 (quoting State v. Bailey, 712 P.2d 281, 286 (Utah 1985)); see also 
State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, If 31, 94 P.3d 186 ("It is clear that a prosecutor's 
comments about the 'paucity or absence' of a defendant's evidence does not offend 
constitutional guarantees against self-incrimination."). And, "when a defendant has 
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testified during a trial, it is proper during a closing argument to comment on defendant's 
credibility." Jimenez, 2001 UT App 68, f 16; see also Baker, 963 P.2d at 804 ("[C]ourts 
generally recognize that, during closing arguments, a prosecutor may comment on the 
credibility of witnesses."); State v. Cummins, 839 P.2d 848, 853 (Utah App. 1992) 
(upholding trial court's ruling that prosecutor's "suggestion that defendant had 
manufactured his testimony . . . [was a] 'logical[] extension[] of . . . the facts of th[e] 
case,' and 'reasonable inference[s]'") (citations omitted; ellipses in original). 
In this case, the State presented evidence of the monthly income received by 
defendant's motel based on room receipts it had seized from the motel office after the 
arson (R. 395:235, 238-43). In his defense, defendant testified that the State's calculation 
of his motel's monthly income was inaccurate because it did not include receipts that 
defendant's father-in-law kept in his apartment (R. 396:116-17). Defendant, however, 
did not produce those additional receipts at trial, nor did he explain why those receipts 
were not produced (R. 396:116-17). 
In closing argument, the prosecutor reviewed its evidence concerning the motel's 
monthly income (R. 396:200-01). In the course of that review, the prosecutor noted, 
"[B]y the way, Mr. Tabesh said they didn't get all the receipts. This is what we have 
here. I haven't seen any others brought it" (R. 396:200-01). 
Contrary to defendant's claim, the prosecutor's comments did not imply that 
defendant had any burden of proof. Rather, where defendant testified at trial, the 
prosecutor's comments were proper "comment on defendant's credibility," Jimenez, 2001 
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UT App 68, U 16, and "the paucity or absence of evidence adduced by the defense" 
corroborating defendant's testimony, Tilt, 2004 UT App 395, ^ 18 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted); Nelson-Waggoner, 2004 UT 29, f 31. Thus, the prosecutor's 
comments clearly fell within the "considerable latitude" given counsel in closing 
argument to address "the evidence adduced and the reasonable inferences to be drawn 
therefrom." Baker, 963 P.2d at 804 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The 
prosecutor's comments, therefore, did not "call the jurors' attention to matters not proper 
for their consideration." Jimenez, 2001 UT App 68, ^ f 15 (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
Even if the prosecutor's remarks were improper, defendant cannot show "a 
reasonable likelihood [that they] prejudiced] the jury by significantly influencing its 
verdict." Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). First, the prosecutor's brief 
comments occurred in the middle of its initial closing argument, after which the 
prosecutor did not address the issue again. Cf. State v. Byrd, 937 P.2d 532, 536 (Utah 
App. 1997) (holding frequency of comment is relevant in determining prejudice). 
Second, because defendant's testimony concerning the State's miscalculation of 
the motel's income was central to his defense, the likelihood that defense counsel would 
have addressed defendant's testimony in his closing argument, even if the prosecutor had 
not done so first, is very high. At that point, the prosecutor certainly could have 
responded to defense counsel's statements in rebuttal with the same remarks the 
prosecutor made during his argument. Cf. Tilt, 2004 UT App 395, ^  18 (holding that 
25 
where defendant opens door "by arguing at length in his closing argument to the jury that 
it should acquit him based upon [defense] theory," prosecutor "was entitled to rebut 
[these] remarks" by commenting on the lack of evidence supporting defendant's theory) 
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (second alteration in original). 
Third, defense counsel responded to the prosecutor's remarks in his closing 
argument and reminded the jury that defendant had no burden to produce any evidence in 
a criminal trial, stating, "It's not my job. It is [the prosecutor's] job. It's their burden of 
proof (R. 396:225). 
Finally, the trial court instructed the jury three times concerning the burden of 
proof in a criminal case. It did so first before the trial began (R. 207-10; R. 383:9; R. 
393:131, 140). It did so again just before closing argument (R. 207-10; R. 383:9; R. 
396:190). And, at defendant's request, it did so a third time after closing argument, when 
the court re-iterated "that at no time does the burden ever shift to the defendant to 
produce any evidence with respect to a criminal case" (R. 383:9; R. 396:244). Defendant 
has not shown that the prosecutor's brief comments were so prejudicial as to defeat the 
mitigating effect of those instructions. See State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, ^24, 999 P.2d 7 
(holding that defendant must show comment was so prejudicial "as to defeat the 
mitigating effect of the court's . . . curative instructions") 
Given these facts, defendant cannot show that he was prejudiced by the 
prosecutor's brief remarks, even if they were improper. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT REVERSIBLE ERROR IN 
ADMITTING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE WHERE THE SAME 
INFERENCE WOULD HAVE EXISTED EVEN IF THE 
CHALLENGED EVIDENCE HAD NOT BEEN ADMITTED 
Defendant claims that the trial court "improperly permitted expert testimony 
regarding inconclusive testing of accelerants found at the lodge." Aplt. Br. at 34 
(capitalization omitted). Specifically, defendant claims that the trial court improperly 
allowed expert testimony concerning "a comparison . . . made between a store-bought can 
of paint thinner and the accelerant used in the fire" because "the results of this 
comparison were inconclusive" and "insufficient evidence was presented establishing that 
the store-bought paint thinner had the same chemical composition as the thinner found at 
the Lodge." Aplt. Bt. at 36. This Court should reject defendant's claim because he 
cannot show that he was prejudiced by the trial court's ruling, even if it were erroneous. 
A. Proceedings below. 
At trial, the fire marshal testified that he found evidence of accelerant pours both 
in room 112 and in the hallway to the rooms above room 112 (R. 394:164-66, 172, 186-
87). Officers testified that they seized two containers of paint thinner—an 
accelerant—from defendant's property (R. 395:232) One of those containers was paint 
thinner labeled Clean Strip; the other was labeled E-Z Paint Thinner (R. 395:232). 
Jennifer McNair, a crime lab expert, then testified. McNair testified that the main 
accelerant used in the fires was gasoline (R. 396:11-13). However, a different accelerant, 
a "medium petroleum distillate," was found on carpet in the closet of room 112 (R. 
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396:13-14). McNair testified that paint thinners are medium petroleum distillates (R. 
396:13). 
McNair testified that she compared the paint thinner in the container labeled Clean 
Strip to the accelerant used in the closet, and that the Clean Strip thinner was not 
consistent with the accelerant used in the closet (R. 396:14-15). McNair then testified 
that the amount of paint thinner in the other container, labeled E-Z Paint Thinner, was 
insufficient to compare to the accelerant used in the closet (R. 396:16). As a result, the 
crime lab purchased a different container of E-Z Paint Thinner from a local store and used 
that to make the comparison with the accelerant used in the closet (R. R. 396:16). 
When the prosecutor asked McNair what the results of that comparison were, 
defendant objected on the basis of foundation and relevance (R. 396:16). Specifically, 
defendant argued that, "without further foundation as to manufacturing date and other 
things, it leaves the jury simply to speculate as to that" (R. 396:17). Thus, defendant 
asserted, the evidence was inadmissible under rules 403, 701 and 702 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence (R. 396:17, 20). 
The prosecutor then proffered the expert's testimony: "[S]he is not going to testify 
that it was a definitive match. What she is going to say is that they are sufficiently similar 
that she can't exclude it. It could have been the same, or it may not have been the same, 
but that's the most she can do with it" (R. 396:18). 
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The trial court ruled: "The Court is going to permit her to testify as to what the 
results of the test were. And, clearly, as Mr. Yengich has pointed out, at least in my mind, 
it's not very convincing evidence" (R. 396:20). 
The expert then responded to the prosecutor's question concerning the results of 
the comparison between the store-bought paint thinner and the accelerant found in the 
closet. She testified that "[d]ue to the lack of environmental control of the questioned 
sample [from the closet], no conclusion as to common origin could be made" (R. 396:21). 
Thus, the two accelerants "could not be matched" (R. 396:23). However, they also 
"could not be excluded from each other" (R. 396:23). 
On cross-examination, defense counsel asked: "Well, I guess, scientifically when 
you say you can't exclude it, that doesn't really give us a lot to go on, does it? Just simply 
means that there's no conclusion that can be drawn from it, effectively?" (R. 396:23). 
McNair responded, "That's correct" (R. 396:23). 
B. Defendant's claim fails because he has not shown prejudice. 
"Although the admission or exclusion of evidence is a question of law, [this Court] 
review[s] a trial court's decision to admit or exclude specific evidence for an abuse of 
discretion." State v. Cruz-Meza, 2003 UT 32, \ 8, 76 P.3d 1165. "[E]ven where error is 
found, reversal is appropriate only in those cases where, after review of all the evidence 
presented at trial, it appears that absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood that a 
different result would have been reached." State v. Norton, 2003 UT App 88, \ 11, 67 
P.3d 1050 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted; alteration in original). 
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In this case, this Court need not decide whether the trial court's ruling was 
erroneous because defendant cannot show that "absent the error, there is a reasonable 
likelihood that a different result would have been reached." Id. 
Jennifer McNair first testified that the Clean Strip paint thinner found on 
defendant's property was not the accelerant used in the closet (R. 396:14-15). She then 
testified that there was an insufficient amount of E-Z Paint Thinner in the container found 
on defendant's property to make any comparison (R. R. 396:16). 
Over defendant's objection, McNair then testified that the comparison between the 
store-bought E-Z Paint Thinner and the accelerant used in the closet was inconclusive (R. 
396:21). Thus, the two accelerants could neither "be matched" nor "excluded from each 
other." (R. 396:23). Rather, as defense counsel confirmed on cross-examination, "there's 
no conclusion that can be drawn from" the comparison (R. 396:23). 
No prejudice resulted from this testimony, even if it were erroneously admitted. 
The jury had already been told that there was insufficient E-Z Paint Thinner recovered 
from the motel to compare it to the accelerant used in the closet. Thus, the clear inference 
before the jury—even before the expert's challenged testimony—was that no evidence 
excluded the E-Z Paint Thinner found at the scene from the accelerant used in the closet. 
Because this is the same evidence that was before the jury after the challenged 
testimony was admitted, defendant cannot show that, absent the challenged testimony, 
"there is a reasonable likelihood that a different result would have been reached." 
Norton, 2003 UT App 88, ^  11 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State asks this Court to affirm defendant's 
conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED _J_ March 2005. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
KAREN A. KLUCZNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Addendum A 
Addendum A 
76-6-105. Aggravated arson, 
(1) A person is guilty of aggravated arson if by means of fire or explosives he 
intentionally and unlawfully damages: 
(a) a habitable structure; or 
(b) any structure or vehicle when any person not a participant in the 
offense is in the structure or vehicle. 
(2) Aggravated arson is a felony of the first degree. 
